Abstract-Standard economic theory predicts that if property rights to pollute are clearly established, equilibrium outcomes in an efficient emissions permit market will be independent of how the emissions permits are initially distributed. This so-called independence property has important implications for policy design and implementation. Past studies document a strong positive correlation between the initial permit allocation and firm-level emissions, raising concerns that the independence property is failing to hold in real-world settings. We exploit the random assignment of firms to different permit allocation cycles in Southern California's RECLAIM program in order to test the independence of permit allocation and emissions. Our results lend empirical support to the independence hypothesis.
I. Introduction
M ARKET-BASED pollution permit trading programs have moved to the forefront of industrial environmental regulation. A particularly appealing quality of the cap-and-trade (CAT) approach to regulating industrial emissions is that an efficient permit market will direct firms with the lowest abatement costs to reduce emissions first (Coase, 1960; Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 1972) . Importantly, provided a series of conditions are met, this efficient allocation of abatement activities will be achieved regardless of how the emissions permits are initially allocated. 1 This paper presents empirical evidence on the relationship between the initial allocation of permits and the ultimate distribution of permitted emissions in a landmark cap-and-trade program.
The independence of permit market outcomes and the initial allocation of permits helps to explain why cap-and-trade systems have emerged as the preferred instrument in a variety of environmental policy settings (Hahn & Stavins, 2011) . If the initial distribution of permits plays no role in determining emissions and abatement outcomes in equilibrium, emissions permits can be freely allocated to pursue political objectives without compromising the economic efficiency of permit market outcomes. Free allocation of emissions permits to industrial stakeholders has played a critical role in securing political support for existing CAT programs (Joskow & Schmalensee, 1998; Hahn & Stavins, 2011) .
The theory literature has identified several conditions under which the so-called independence property might fail to hold. 2 And the courts have begun to question this independence, noting that "the market would only bear out that assumption if the transaction costs of trading emissions were small, which is hardly likely" (North Carolina v. EPA, No. 05-1244 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 2008 ). 3 If transaction costs, regulatory uncertainty, and other real-world complications imply substantive violations of independence property in practice, this has important implications for policy design and implementation.
A growing empirical literature seeks to shed light on this issue. One potentially meaningful finding, documented across a range of cap-and-trade-programs, is that a significant share of the allowances retired each year for compliance purposes is surrendered by the same firms to which they were initially allocated (Ellerman, 2000; Gangadharan, 2000; Hanemann, 2009; Kerr & Mare, 1998; Montero, Sanchez, & Katz, 2002) . 4 Researchers have put forward a variety of explanations. 5 This autarkic compliance has been construed as evidence that the initial permit allocation is playing a role in determining permit market outcomes. 6 2 For example, Hahn (1984) shows that the final allocation of permitted emissions can depend on the initial distribution of permits if permit markets are imperfectly competitive. Stavins (1995) demonstrates that the permit market equilibrium can be sensitive to the initial allocation of permits in the presence of transaction costs. Montero et al. (1998) shows that when firms face transaction costs in the permit market and are uncertain about whether their permit trades will be approved, firm-level emissions are more likely to be increasing with initial permit allocations. Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan (2012) note that the independence property may fail to hold in a dynamic setting where firms' entry and exit decisions are contingent upon how permits are allocated. 3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled unanimously against the Clean Air Interstate Rule, which was intended to be the largest, most comprehensive CAT program in U.S. history. In this ruling, the court questioned the assumption that equilibrium emissions would be independent of the initial allocation. 4 In the much-heralded Acid Rain Program, it is estimated that less than 30% of the allowances retired each year for compliance purposes were surrendered by a source other than the source to which the permit had been allocated (Kreutzer, 2006) . A similar degree of autarkic compliance is found in the U.S. lead trading program (Kerr & Mare, 1998) . Montero et al. (2002) finds very limited trading activity in an emissions trading program in Santiago, Chile. Gangadharan (2000) finds striking rates of nonparticipation in Southern California's RECLAIM trading program. More recent studies of the EU ETS show firms expressing a preference for autarkic compliance strategies (Pinkse, 2008; Sandoff & Schaad, 2009 ). Finally, evolving markets for water pollution across the United States have so far generated minimal trades ("Environmental Markets at Centre of Chesapeake Clean-Up Plan," Environmental Finance, May 2010).
5 Possible explanations for autarkic compliance behavior include transaction costs (Gangadharan, 2000) , managerial preferences for keeping emissions within the allocated limit (Malloy, 2002; Sandoff & Schaad, 2009) , regulatory uncertainty (Montero et al., 2002) , the endowment effect (Murphy & Stranlund, 2007) , and loss aversion (Kreutzer, 2006) . 6 Possible explanations for autarkic compliance behavior include transaction costs (Gangadharan, 2000) , managerial preferences for keeping emissions within the allocated limit (Malloy, 2002; Sandoff & Schaad, 2009) , regulatory uncertainty (Montero et al., 2002) , the endowment effect (Murphy & Stranlund, 2007) , and loss aversion (Kreutzer, 2006) .
A strong positive correlation between permit allocations and emissions is consistent with, but not proof of, a violation of the independence property. Formally testing for a causal relationship between permit allocations and emissions is complicated. Firms' initial permit allocations are typically determined by historic emissions, operating characteristics, or ex ante expected abatement costs, all of which are likely to affect firms' future emissions trajectories. This makes it difficult to credibly separate and identify the effect of the permit allocation on facility-level emissions.
This paper uses detailed data from Southern California's Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) to test for a causal relationship between firms' initial permit allocations and emissions. The RECLAIM market has the longest history of any locally designed and implemented CAT program. Transaction costs and regulatory uncertainty are well documented in the RECLAIM market (Gangadharan, 2000; Schubert & Zerlauth, 1999; US EPA, 2002) . Consequently, we might expect to find a relationship between firm-level emissions and the initial permit allocation in this particular market context.
The RECLAIM program is particularly well suited for a study of the relationship between firm-level allocations and emissions. Firm-level permit allocations (completely determined at the outset of the RECLAIM program) vary across both firms and time. Moreover, the facilities in the program were randomly assigned to one of two permit allocation cycles. We exploit this very unusual design feature, using the random assignment to permit allocation cycles as an instrument for facility-level permit allocations. 7 The main empirical findings are as follows. First, consistent with past studies, we document a strong positive relationship between firm-level emissions and permit allocations in the cross-section. If this statistical relationship were to be interpreted as causal, we would conclude that a 1% increase in the number of permits allocated to a facility increases emissions at that facility by 0.8%. When we include facility-level fixed effects, the strength of the relationship attenuates, but the relationship remains strong, economically significant, and positive. When we instrument for facilitylevel permit allocations using only the variation generated by random assignment to compliance cycles, the relationship between a facility's permit allocations and emissions disappears. We fail to reject the hypothesis that facility-level emissions in equilibrium are independent of how RECLAIM permits were initially allocated.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the identification problem that complicates the interpretation of a strong positive correlation between permit allocations and emissions. Section III provides an overview of the RECLAIM program. Section 7 This identification strategy is similar in spirit to Reguant and Ellerman (2008) who exploit the fact that Spanish coal-fired electricity-generating units were allocated emissions allowances using a function that rewards certain cleaner sources. These authors find no systematic relationship between the initial endowment and production decisions at the unit level.
IV describes the data and provides some summary statistics. Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI concludes.
II. The Econometric Identification Problem
We use a standard factor demand model to illustrate some conditions under which the independence property can fail to hold. Section IIB discusses the econometric challenges that complicate an empirical analysis of the relationship between firms' initial permit allocation and subsequent emissions choices.
A. Derived Demand for Emissions
We assume that profit-maximizing firms operate in perfectly competitive input and output markets. We further assume that production technologies can be represented by a strictly concave, twice-differentiable production function q(e, x; z), where e denotes emissions (modeled as an input to production), x is a vector of other inputs, and z denotes the fixed operating characteristics that define the production technology or process. For expository purposes, we consider a simple production process that employs only two variable inputs: emissions and a generic input x.
Firms' emissions are regulated under a CAT program in which emissions permits are distributed a gratis. A firm's initial permit allocation is denoted by A. We assume that this initial allocation is completely determined at the outset of the program. To remain in compliance, firms must hold permits to offset any uncontrolled emissions. Firms act as price takers in the permit market. The market-clearing permit price is τ.
The indirect profit function for a representative firm is given by π = Pq(e, x; z) − ω x x + τA − τe.
Factor demand, including demand for emissions, is implicitly defined by the first-order conditions for an interior solution to this profit maximization. Within this simple framework, it is straightforward to show that the firm's profitmaximizing choice of emissions is completely independent of its initial permit allocation A.
Previous work has identified several conditions under which this independence might fail to hold. For instance, consider the implications of introducing transaction costs into the model. Let u denote the quantity of permits traded by the firm: u = (e − A). Following Stavins (1995) , we define a common transaction cost function, T (u), for which T (u) > 0 and T (u) can be positive, negative, or zero valued. The firm's profit function can now be written as
The partial derivative of the firm's demand for emissions with respect to the initial permit allocation is now given by (see appendix A) Malloy (2002) and others that this kind of modeling framework ignores more nuanced and potentially important dimensions of firm decision making. Viewing the firm as an organization comprising many actors with different management objectives opens up additional explanations for why a firm's choice of emissions might be influenced by its initial permit allocation (see, for example, Hanemann, 2010; Von Malmborg, 2008) .
B. Econometric Challenges
The kinds of assumptions on which the independence property is predicated (for example, no transaction costs, regulatory certainty, pure profit maximization) are unlikely to be perfectly satisfied in real-world policy settings. This could, in principle, result in violations of the independence property. We are interested in empirically testing whether the number of permits initially allocated to a firm affects the firm's demand for emissions inputs.
The following econometric model serves as the basis for our empirical tests:
The dependent variable, e it , is the log of emissions at firm i in time t; A it is the log of the firm's permit allocation in time t. The δ t 's denote a full set of time-period effects that capture common shocks to (or common trends in) firm-level emissions. x it is a vector of input prices and producer prices that vary across both firms and time. The error term η it captures the effects of any omitted variables. This error term can be decomposed into omitted, permanent, firm-specific omitted factors, α i , and a residual ε it . The coefficient φ captures the effect of the initial permit allocation on firm-level emissions.
Consistent estimation of φ is complicated by the manner in which permits are typically allocated to firms in cap-andtrade programs. It is standard for policymakers to allocate relatively more emissions permits to firms that have historically accounted for a larger share of emissions or anticipate disproportionately high emissions abatement costs. In other words, A it is determined by a set of factors that we expect 8 The literature points to several reasons that we might observe nonlinearities in C(u). For example, Montero (1998) considers regulatory uncertainty regarding whether the transaction will be approved. The likelihood of approval varies nonlinearly with u. This form of uncertainty increases the likelihood that firms' initial permit allocations will positively affect their profit-maximizing choice of e. will significantly determine the firm's emissions under the emissions trading program. If we do not adequately control for these factors, the A it will be correlated with the error term in equation (1).
If firm-level permit allocations vary significantly over time, we can use within-firm variation to identify an effect of permit allocations on firm-level emissions. This purges our estimates of the effects of all permanent plant characteristics that determine both permit allocations and emissions. However, this strategy does nothing to control for time-varying omitted factors, which can be particularly problematic in this setting. As firm-level permit allocations decrease over time, so too does the aggregate emissions cap. In an efficient permit market characterized by abatement cost heterogeneity, we should expect heterogeneous emissions responses to the tightening of the aggregate cap. For example, a cost-minimizing firm with relatively low abatement costs will respond by reducing its emissions substantively over time, whereas a firm with relatively high abatement costs will reduce emissions less, if at all. If these cost-effective, firm-specific responses to changing permit market conditions are correlated with the rate at which firm-specific permit allocations decrease over time, the fixed-effects estimator of φ will be biased.
One solution to this identification problem would involve allocating emissions permits randomly across firms. This would ensure that the variation we are using to estimate the φ parameter is independent of other factors that determine emissions. Although an ideal research design, random allocation of permits across stakeholders is unlikely to be politically viable or desirable in any meaningful policy context.
In the absence of purely experimental data, we exploit an unusual design feature of Southern California's RECLAIM program, which generates exogenous variation in the timing of firms' permit allocations. In the sections that follow, we describe the RECLAIM program and explain how it provides a unique opportunity to empirically investigate the relationship between initial permit allocations and emissions.
III. Background: The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) covers 10,740 square miles of Southern California, including all of Orange County and parts of Los Angeles, Riverside, and San Bernadino counties. Ozone concentrations in this district exceeded state standards on 184 days in 1991 (Hall & Walton, 1996) . 9 In 1994, regulators introduced the RECLAIM program to bring the region into compliance with state and federal air quality emissions standards. A majority of the firms in the SCAQMD emitting four tons per year or more of nitrogen oxide (NOx) were included in the NOx trading program. 10 The RECLAIM program imposed a mandatory cap on the total quantity of permitted NOx emitted by sources in the program. The cap was designed to reduce NOx emissions at affected sources by 75% by 2003. 11 A corresponding number of reclaim trading credits (RTCs) were allocated to RECLAIM sources at no cost. An RTC confers the right to emit 1 pound of NOx emissions and is valid for one year. Firm-specific allocation schedules, which specified how many permits each firm receives over the duration of the program, were determined and made public in 1994. Section IIIB provides a detailed description of how SCAQMD allocated permits to firms in RECLAIM.
A. Complying with the RECLAIM Program
To remain in compliance with the RECLAIM program, a firm has several options, including reducing production levels, increasing operating efficiency, installing abatement technology, or purchasing permits. 12 If a firm reduces its emissions below its permit allocation, it can sell excess permits. 13 Studies and surveys of market participants indicate that in the first ten years of the program, most firms achieved compliance through purchasing permits or via shortrun changes in production processes such as fuel substitution. Major capital investments in abatement equipment were far less common (SCAQMD, 2000; Schubert & Zerlauth, 1999; U.S. EPA, 2006) . Facility-level emissions are reported and compliance is certified quarterly. A compliance cycle lasts twelve months. At the conclusion of each of the first three-quarters of a compliance cycle, firms have thirty days to acquire any RTCs needed to reconcile their permit holdings with their emissions. Firms are subject to penalties for quarterly shortfalls. 14 Firms have sixty calendar days following the last day of each twelve-month compliance cycle to reconcile fourthquarter emissions with their permit allocation and purchases (SCAQMD, 1993b; U.S. EPA, 2006) . 15 Although permits can 10 Certain sources are categorically excluded from RECLAIM, including restaurants, police and firefighting facilities, potable water delivery operations, and all facilities located in the Riverside County and Los Angeles County portions of the Southeast Desert Air Basin.
11 The RECLAIM program also regulated sulfur dioxide emissions. However, this part of the program was quite small. There are relatively few large point sources of SO 2 in the region because of the heavy reliance on natural gas.
12 Initially RECLAIM facilities also had the option to offset emissions by purchasing and scrapping pre-1982 vehicles. This option was revoked early on in the program.
13 By 2003, 12% of RECLAIM facilities had not participated in the market, 13% had participated as buyers only, 19% as sellers only, and 55% had acted as both buyers and sellers.
14 Facilities that fail to hold sufficient RTCs are required to surrender permits in future periods to cover the shortfall and can be subject to large civil financial penalties.
15 SCAQMD Rule 2004 states that the reconciliation period following the end of a quarter shall be used to reconcile allocations only with emissions from that quarter. A lawsuit filed in September 2003 alleged that SCAQMD has, in some instances, failed to conduct quarterly audits. The case settled be moved across quarters within a twelve-month compliance cycle, an RTC is valid only during the compliance cycle to which it is allocated. Transfers of allowances between compliance periods are not permitted because regulators wanted to guard against temporal concentrations of NOx emissions.
SCAQMD estimates that the average compliance rate (the percentage of firms in compliance with the program) was approximately 90% from 1994 through 1997 (U.S. EPA, 2002) . Noncompliance prior to 1998 was likely due to misunderstanding of the regulation or mistakes in calculation (Lieu, 1998) . Noncompliance became a significant problem during the California electricity crisis in 2000 (Kolstad & Wolak, 2003) . Since 2001, compliance has remained close to 100% (SCAQMD, various years).
B. Allocating Emissions Permits in RECLAIM
During the design stages of the RECLAIM program, the implementing agency recognized the importance of establishing a clear, systematic formula for determining permit allocations prior to formal adoption of the program (Coy & Luong, 2007) . Prior to formal adoption of the program, policy makers established facility-specific allocation schedules specifying exactly how many RTCs each facility would receive (for free) each compliance period. Over the first ten years of the program, facility-specific allocations ratchet down every twelve months.
The allocation methodology, including the formulas and device-specific emission factors used to determine each facility's permit allocation schedule, are clearly laid out in SCAQMD Rule 2002. Two key parameters define the downward trajectory of a firm's permit allocation schedule over the first ten years of the RECLAIM program. The first parameter, P1 i , defines the number of permits allocated to firm i operating devices indexed by d in the first compliance cycle:
The second parameter, P2 i , determines the firm's RTC allocation in the seventh compliance cycle beginning in 2000: 
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were defined to be the maximum annual throughput at the firm between the years 1989 to 1992. 16 The allocation rule specified equipment-specific starting factors ( f 1) and ending factors ( f 2). These factors were based on a review of technologically viable control methods and associated engineering calculations, which took into account the emissions, energy, and economic impacts for all known NOx emissions reduction technologies in each source category. Greater (smaller) reductions were required of processes and devices associated with relatively low (high) cost emissions abatement options. Finally, firm-specific allocation parameters were adjusted to reflect the number of certified emissions reductions (ERCs) held prior to 1994.
New firms entering the program after 1994 are required to obtain sufficient RTCs to offset their NOx emissions. 17 These RTCs could be purchased in the permit market from incumbent facilities. An incumbent firm that ceases to operate retains its RTC holdings.
Before the RECLAIM program got underway, regulators were concerned that firms might not plan sufficiently for their fourth-quarter emissions. Because permits are valid for use only in the compliance cycle to which they are allocated, widespread failure to set aside sufficient permits to cover the fourth quarter emissions could create unnecessary price volatility and a lack of liquidity in the permit market (Carlson & Scholtz, 1994) . To avoid this problem, regulators chose to randomly assign firms to one of two staggered twelve-month compliance cycles. Placement in either cycle was determined by computer-generated random assignment (SCAQMD, 1993a) . RTCs allocated to cycle 1 facilities are valid from January 1 through December 31. RTCs allocated to cycle 2 facilities are valid from July 1 through June 30. A facility can comply using valid permits from either cycle. 18 
C. Transaction Costs and Regulatory Uncertainty
In markets where both transactions costs and regulatory uncertainty are present, we might be more likely to find a positive relationship between firm-level emissions and permit allocations (Montero, 1998; Ben-David et al., 2000) . Both transaction costs and regulatory uncertainty are well documented in RECLAIM (Gangadharan, 2000; U.S. EPA, 2006) .
Firms participating in RECLAIM can incur both explicit and implicit transaction costs. Prior to entering the RTC market, a firm must learn how the program works and determine what it would cost to reduce emissions internally. If a firm 16 These measures were based on annual emissions reports whenever possible. For facilities that had not submitted emissions reports during the 1989-1992 period, device-specific throughput measures were based on information about facility operations and device characteristics. SCAQMD justified the use of maximum (versus average) historical throughput on the grounds that the baseline period was a time of economic recession (Schwarze & Zapfel, 2000) . 17 A small reserve of RTCs was set aside for low-emitting new entrants. 18 Ellerman, Joskow, and Harrison (2003) note that these overlapping cycles increase, to a limited extent, intertemporal flexibility in when permits can be used for compliance.
decides that it wants to participate in the RTC market, it must find a trading partner, negotiate a transaction, and hire any legal, insurance, and brokerage services it deems necessary. Firms also incur a transaction fee, split equally between the buyer and seller, that helps to fund the administration of the RECLAIM program. 19 Several surveys of RECLAIM market participants have collected information about transaction costs. Early on, brokers reported charging a fixed fee of $150 per trade and a variable fee of 3.5% of the transaction value (Burnside & Eichenbaum, 1996) . In a more recent survey, market participants estimated that total broker fees amounted to 1% to 3% of the total value of the trades (U.S. EPA, 2002) . RECLAIM firms also report having to devote considerable human resources to learning about the RECLAIM market and monitoring compliance status (Schubert & Zerlauth, 1999) .
Regulatory uncertainty has manifested in a variety of forms in the RECLAIM program. First, questionable brokerage practices in RECLAIM have created considerable uncertainty about compliance approval. One of the major RTC brokers, the Automated Credit Exchange, has been sued repeatedly for failing to deliver RTCs that were paid for by their clients. 20 Furthermore, seventeen substantive amendments to the RECLAIM program rules since 1994 have exacerbated uncertainty about how the regulation will be interpreted and enforced (EPA, 2006) . 21 Emissions monitoring and enforcement practices have also created considerable uncertainty about compliance approval. If emissions data for a RECLAIM source are missing, the regulator computes the maximum possible emissions for that source. If the regulator concludes ex post that a firm did not have sufficient permits to cover its reported or imputed emissions, the firm's subsequent allocation is reduced by the total amount of the violation. Noncompliance can also be punished by stiff monetary penalties, although the penalties are not automatic and are negotiated on a case-by-case basis (Stranlund & Charez, 2000) .
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics
To construct the data set used in this analysis, we submitted multiple public records requests to the agency that oversees the RECLAIM program. We obtained facility-level information regarding compliance cycle assignment, variables used to determine initial RTC allocation schedules, annual RTC allocations, and quarterly emissions certifications. Appendix B includes a more detailed description of the data.
This section first documents trends in both emissions and permit allocations over the duration of our study and then demonstrates a high level of consistency between the permit allocations we observe in the data and the permit allocation rules and protocols as defined by the implementing agency. It next characterizes the variation that is generated by random cycle assignment.
A. Emissions and Permit Allocations
SCAQMD maintains a detailed database tracking all NOx permits and firm-level emissions in RECLAIM. From these data, we recovered the NOx permit allocation schedules for the facilities comprising the program universe when the program was initially implemented. Some of these facilities were ultimately excluded from the RECLAIM program because information certified after the initial audit demonstrated that their baseline emissions fell below the threshold for participation. We exclude these from our analysis. In total, 376 of the facilities in the original universe reported and certified emissions during our study period. Figure 1 plots NOx emissions and RTC allocations over the period 1994 to 2004. To generate this figure, annual RTC allocations are divided equally across the four quarters of the corresponding compliance cycle. The aggregate emissions cap, or the total quantity of permits allocated to firms in the program, ratchets down every six months as roughly half of the RECLAIM firms transition from one compliance cycle to the next. The large increase in permits allocated in mid-1994 occurs because firms assigned to cycle 2 did not join the program until July.
The broken line in figure 1 plots the permits allocated to firms reporting emissions in a given quarter. There are a number of reasons that not all firms receiving an initial permit allocation report emissions in all quarters. Some firms that received permit allocations initially were later exempted from the program following corrections to the data used to generate the original RECLAIM universe. In the aftermath of the California electricity crisis, electricity producers were categorically excluded from the RECLAIM program and subject to command-and-control regulation (SCAQMD, 2001) . Other missing emissions observations are due to facility closures, late reporting, or nonreporting (discussed in detail in appendix 1). 22 It is instructive to compare the level of the aggregate emissions cap with reported NOx emissions (summed across reporting facilities). The gray line in figure 1 plots reported quarterly NOx emissions. If the emissions cap were binding and program compliance were perfect, we should expect aggregate emissions to closely track the emissions cap over time. 23 However, this is not what we observe. Two features stand out in particular. First, the cap on emissions did not bind in the early years of the program. When designing the 22 According to the annual program reports released by SCAQMD, none of the firms that ceased operations during the study period cited RECLAIM as contributing to the decision to close down (AQMD Annual Reports, 1994 -2004 . 23 Note that we would not necessarily expect a perfect correlation in emissions and the aggregate cap over time if the program had permitted banking and borrowing of permits across periods. program, SCAQMD regulators anticipated that the aggregate cap would start to bind in 1996 or 1997 (Schubert & Zerlauth, 1999) . Figure 1 suggests that this "cross-over" actually occurred in 1998. 24 Prior to 1998, permit prices were very low (averaging $227 per ton).
Second, systemwide emissions exceeded permitted emissions in 1999 and 2000. During California's electricity crisis, RTC prices rose sharply to levels as high as $62,500 per ton. Several firms failed to acquire sufficient permits to offset their emissions during this turbulent time (SCAQMD, 2001) . Once the crisis passed, average prices dropped to $2,000 per ton, and noncompliance ceased to be an issue.
B. Are the Data Consistent with the Permit Allocation Rules?
Our research design relies to a significant extent on the manner in which permits were allegedly allocated in RECLAIM. It is therefore important to verify that the observed data are consistent with the program rules as stated.
We begin by showing that facility-level permit allocation schedules observed in the data are consistent with the allocation equations described in Rule 2002. Using the facility-specific P1 and P2 parameters and the equations described in the rule, we construct annual permit allocations for each facility over the period 1994 to 2004. 25 When we regress observed permit allocations on our constructed values, the estimated coefficient on the predicted allocation 24 Although the aggregate emissions cap did not start to bind until 1998, several individual facilities emitted at or in excess of their allocation in the early years of the program (U.S. EPA, 2002) . Interestingly, in the early years of the program, some facilities fell into noncompliance while other facilities let unused permits expire. 25 More precisely, to construct our predicted allocation, we assume annual permit allocations decrease at facility-specific rates (reductions of variable is 0.99 (R 2 > 0.99). The error term captures rounding errors and, in a very small number of cases, a discrepancy between our constructed values and observed allocations. In these few cases, the parameters defining a firm's allocation trajectory were adjusted in the years after the program began. 26 Another important feature of the RTC allocation process, and one that is essential to our identification strategy, is the random assignment of firms to compliance cycles. Our empirical approach is predicated on the assumption that this cycle assignment was truly random, as reported by the implementing agency (SCAQMD, 1993a) . To demonstrate the plausibility of this assumption, we run a series of tests to ascertain whether the distribution of observed facility characteristics across the two compliance cycles is consistent with the random assignment mechanism described in the rule. Table 1A summarizes the key parameters that define firm-level permit allocations and some potentially important determinants of abatement choices and permit trading activity. Columns 1 and 2 report means and standard deviations by compliance cycle. Firms assigned to cycle 1 report higher levels of historic emissions on average and receive larger RTC 26 Firms that disagreed with their initial permit allocation could appeal to have the allocations amended. Some requests to amend allocations were received as late as 1999. Importantly, compliance cycle assignment was unaffected by these amendments. allocations in the first compliance cycle. 27 The third column presents the difference in mean characteristics across cycles 1 and 2, respectively. Column 4 reports the p-values from a standard t-test (allowing for unequal variances). Differences in historic emissions and RTC allocation parameters are not statistically significant.
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In addition to the temporal designation, RTCs are also classified as either "inland" or "coastal." Firms in the coastal zone cannot use permits purchased from an inland source to achieve compliance. Firms located in the inland zone face no spatial restrictions on their trading activities. 28 Although a larger share of cycle 2 firms are located in the more restricted coastal zone, this difference is not statistically significant.
Panel B of table 1 summarizes the industrial composition of the facilities assigned to each compliance cycle. For ease of exposition, these industrial categories are consolidated. 29 We conduct both individual and joint tests for differences 27 We obtained historic emissions measures for approximately 80% of the firms in our data. These are also summarized in table 1. As we should expect, maximum historic emissions are strongly but not perfectly correlated with the P1 parameters (the correlation coefficient is 0.97). 28 The geography of the Los Angeles Basin is such that emissions in the inland zone tend to stay inland, whereas emissions originating in the coastal zone can blow inland, thus exacerbating air quality problems in the inland region. Spatial trading restrictions are designed to limit the extent to which permitted emissions are concentrated in the inland zone.
29 RECLAIM facilities are classified using six-digit NAICS categories. A small fraction (2%) of facilities cannot be uniquely mapped to a single industry classification because they report affiliations with multiple industries.
in industrial composition across cycles. As indicated by the p-values in the fourth column, we find no statistically significant differences. These results are robust to using more disaggregated industrial classifications. Moreover, the Fstatistic of a regression of a binary compliance cycle indicator on the observable characteristics summarized by table 1 and industry dummy variables is 0.89. Our final suite of tests for an association between the cycle assignment and preassignment covariates more explicitly captures the underlying structure of the process that generated cycle assignments. When assigning facilities to cycles, the implementing agency was primarily concerned with dividing allocated permits, versus facilities, approximately equally across cycles. 30 To generate the second set of p-values reported in column 5, we simulate this random assignment process under the null hypothesis. More precisely, we generate 5,000 assignment vectors that randomly assign facilities to cycles subject to the constraint that permit allocations are equal across cycles. For each realization, we compute the differences in covariate means across compliance cycles and approximate the p-value using the fraction of these that are as extreme as, or more extreme than, the differences reported in table 1. These simulated p-values are reported in column 5. Consistent with the results reported above, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no association between observable characteristics and cycle assignment.
C. Attrition and Missing Data
We do not have a balanced panel of quarterly emissions reports. The maximum number of biannual emissions reports is 22 for cycle 1 firms and 21 for cycle 2 firms (recall that firms assigned to cycle 2 enter the program in July 1994). Panel C of table 1 summarizes both the overall rate of nonreporting and the rates at which facilities permanently disappear from the data (presumably due to plant closure). We report attrition rates in the first full year of the program (1994), the first half of the study period, and the second half of the study period during which the aggregate cap was clearly binding. We find no significant differences in missing data or attrition rates across compliance cycles.
D. Summarizing the Variation in Permit Allocations Due to Random Cycle Assignment
From an econometric perspective, the variation in permit allocations generated by the random assignment of firms to compliance cycles has both strengths and limitations. By virtue of random assignment, observable and unobservable determinants of emissions are identically distributed across compliance cycles in expectation. This is a strength we will exploit. A limitation is that random cycle assignment generates variation in the timing of permit allocations, but it does 30 Because facility-specific permit allocations are lumpy, the number of permits allocated to each cycle differs by a small margin. The upper-step functions plot RTC permit allocations summed across facilities within a compliance cycle. The two lines closest to the horizontal axis plot differences in permit allocations across allocation cycles and differences in emissions across allocation cycles.
not affect the quantity of permits a firm receives during any given compliance cycle. Figure 2 illustrates how random cycle assignment affects the timing of RTC allocations in aggregate. The descending step function drawn with a solid line illustrates how the quantity of emissions permits allocated to facilities assigned to cycle 1 decreases over time. The dashed line corresponds to cycle 2. On average, a facility's allocation of operable emissions permits is 15% larger in the first six months of each year under a cycle 2 assignment (as compared to the allocation the facility would receive under a cycle 1 assignment). In the second half of each year, all firms are operating within the same compliance period and facility-specific permit allocations are unaffected by cycle assignment Because permits cannot be transferred from one compliance cycle to another, the timing of a firm's permit allocations is a potentially important determinant of emissions in the RECLAIM program. If firms are taking advantage of the flexibility afforded by emissions permit trading, the timing of emissions reductions will depend on the aggregate emissions cap, but should not be affected by the firm's compliance cycle assignment. In contrast, if firms are pursuing an autarkic compliance strategy and adjusting emissions so as to stay within their allocated emissions limit, a facility assigned would emit fewer emissions in the first half of the year if it was assigned to cycle 1 versus cycle 2. We exploit the random variation in the timing of facility-level permit allocation to test for evidence of this compliance cycle effect.
The two lines closest to the horizontal axis in figure 2 provide a preliminary look at this relationship. The step function that vacillates up and down around 0 subtracts the quantity of permits allocated to cycle 1 facilities each quarter from the corresponding quantity of permits allocated to cycle 2 facilities. The points connected by a solid black line denote the corresponding difference in quarterly emissions across cycles. Comparing these two lines, we see no clear evidence of a correlation between relative changes in permit allocations and emissions levels, respectively.
V. Are Emissions Independent of the Initial Permit Allocation?
This section is divided into three subsections. We first present the results from estimating several alternative specifications of equation (1). We next implement an instrumental variable strategy and then evaluate the robustness of the results. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the firm level so that they are robust against arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (see Wooldridge, 2002) .
A. Baseline Specification
We begin by estimating a restrictive form of equation (1) that includes only the log of the initial permit allocation and time period fixed effects on the right-hand side. Our preferred unit of observation is a facility-by-six-month period. Biannual time periods are defined as January to June and July to December of each calendar year. Recall that staggered compliance cycles generate variation in permit allocations but not within six-month periods across. Each time a subset of firms transitions to a new compliance period (this occurs in January for cycle 1 and June for cycle 2), some subset of allocated RTCs ceases to be valid, while another set of permits becomes eligible for use.
Time fixed effects are included in equation (1) to capture the average effect of time-varying determinants of emissions, including changes in the aggregate emissions cap that is steadily tightening over the study period. After controlling for the average downward trend in facility-level emissions, a strong, statistically significant relationship between initial permit allocations and firm-level emissions persists. The OLS estimate of φ is 0.79 (reported in column 1 in table 2). This strong and positive correlation is consistent with the patterns of autarkic compliance documented elsewhere in the literature.
Specification (2) adds controls for factors that determine both emissions and permit allocations. The allocation parameter P1 is used to proxy for historic emissions. 31 Ideally, we would also control for variation in abatement costs. These costs are notoriously difficult to measure directly. Instead, we include the difference in allocation parameters, P1 − P2, as a proxy for variation in expected compliance costs. Recall that permit allocations were reduced more (less) quickly among firms with ex ante expected low (high) abatement costs. When these allocation variables are included, the estimate of φ remains positive and highly statistically significant (column 2 in table 2).
A third specification adds proxies for determinants of emissions that vary both over time and across firms. These include industry-and county-specific wage measures and industry-specific producer price indices. The inclusion of these variables does not significantly affect the parameter estimate of interest (column 3 in table 2). 32 Significant intertemporal variation in facility-specific permit allocations facilitates the inclusion of facility-specific fixed effects. This purges our estimates of permanent plant characteristics that determine both permit allocations and emissions. The fixed-effects (FE) estimate of φ is 0.49 with a standard error of 0.13. Although this point estimate is somewhat smaller than the estimates reported in columns 1 through 3, it remains highly significant and positive. If we assume that 31 Alternatively, we could use the benchmark emissions measures that were used to calculate facility-specific allocation schedules. As noted in section III, we could not obtain these measures for all facilities. Among the 80% of facilities for which we could obtain these measures, the correlation between benchmark emissions and the initial allocation parameter (P1) is 0.97 32 Because not all firms in the data can be mapped to unique industry identifiers, adding these variables to the estimating equation reduces the number of observations in the data.
this FE estimate identifies the causal effect of the initial allocation on emissions, we would conclude that a 1% increase (decrease) in a firm's permit allocation leads, on average, to a 0.5% increase (decrease) in emissions.
B. Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Relationship between Initial Permit Allocations and Emissions
For expositional purposes, we define assignment to cycle 1 as the control assignment, whereas assignment to cycle 2 is defined as the treatment. Recall that cycle assignment affects the number of operable permits allocated to a facility in the first half of every calendar year. We construct our instrument Z it by interacting a cycle 2 indicator variable (which equals 1 if firm i is assigned to cycle 2) and a dummy variable that equals 1 if time period t corresponds to the first, versus the second, half of a calendar year. Thus, the treatment in this setting is a delay in the transition to the next compliance cycle (and the associated reduction in permit allocation).
When implementing the IV estimation, we focus our attention on specifications 2 and 3 in table 2. 33 In principle, we need not include covariates or fixed effects in this IV framework. In expectation, randomization ensures that observable and unobservable determinants of emissions are uncorrelated with cycle assignment. However, the inclusion of fixed effects or covariates in the estimating equation helps to compensate for imbalance in determinants of emissions across cycles. We argued in section IVB that this imbalance occurs by chance. However, random imbalances across cycles can confound inference if not properly accounted for. The firm-level fixed effects are particularly effective in reducing the unexplained variance in the emissions outcomes, thus improving the precision of our IV estimates. Our preferred specification (3) therefore includes both time and firm fixed effects. The corresponding first stage (denoted by F) is
where the A it , α i , and δ t are defined as in section 2.
Panel A of table 3 shows a strong first-stage relationship between the instrument and facility-level permit allocations. 34 This relationship is particularly strong in the specification that includes facility fixed effects. The F-statistic on the excluded instrument, a standard measure of instrument strength, is substantially larger when we include fixed effects to reduce the residual variance. However, in both 33 The wage and producer price indices are not found to be significant determinants of facility-level emissions in any specifications that include time fixed effects. Moreover, to include these variables, we must drop 20% of facilities (on account of missing data or affiliation with multiple industrial classifications). We thus exclude these variables from our preferred specifications. 34 The coefficient on the instrument, γ, has an intuitive interpretation. It captures the average effect, in percentage terms, of the cycle 2 assignment on firms' permit allocation in the first half of each year. This is equivalent to the average percentage difference-in-difference in biannual permit allocations. The first difference is taken across the first and second half of each year. The second difference is taken across facilities assigned to cycles 1 and 2. Robust standard errors clustered by facility are in parentheses. Time-period fixed effects are included in all specifications (coefficients not reported).
* Significantly different from 0 at 90% confidence. * * Significantly different from 0 at 95% confidence.
* * * Significantly different from 0 at 99% confidence.
specifications, the proportion of the variability in the endogenous variable that is explained by the excluded instrument (summarized by the partial R 2 ) is low. Panel B reports the IV estimates of the permit allocation coefficient φ. In both specifications, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the allocation coefficient is 0. The estimate in column 1 is very imprecise. In column 2, the inclusion of fixed effects reduces the variance of the IV estimator. The preferred IV estimate of φ is −0.11 with a standard error of 0.32. Two standard error confidence bands exclude the OLS estimates of φ and almost exclude the FE estimate. These results suggest that the positive, statistically significant correlation between the initial permit allocation and firms' emissions is capturing the effect of the endogenous component of permit allocation schedules-the portion that is based on firm-specific operating characteristics and anticipated abatement cost trends-rather than a causal relationship between permit allocations and emissions per se.
The lack of precision in these IV estimates warrants concern and questions about whether the gains from instrumentation justify the substantial loss of efficiency. To address these concerns, we conduct an endogeneity test of the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous. The p-value of the chi square test statistic is 0.07. We reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level but not the 5% level. Nakamura and Nakamura (1998) note that when the partial R 2 on the excluded instrument is low (as it is in our case), the type 2 error rate of this test is high. In this situation, this endogeneity test should not be relied on as the sole means of deciding whether to instrument for a potentially endogenous right-hand-side variable.
A weak rejection of the null hypothesis of no endogeneity (noteworthy given the power properties of the test when the partial R 2 is low) and strong a priori reasons for believing that firm-level permit allocations are correlated with the residual in the estimating equation lead us to conclude that instrumenting for permit allocation is important and worthwhile. Based on our IV estimation results, we fail to reject the hypothesis that firm-level emissions in RECLAIM are independent of the initial distribution of permits. Table 4 investigates the robustness of these estimation results. Columns 3 and 4 demonstrate robustness to using data aggregated quarterly. Although permit allocations do not vary within a biannual time period, facility-level emissions and permit holdings do. Moreover, estimating the model using quarterly data allows us to use all available emissions data. 35 Using quarterly data, our results are virtually unchanged. Slight differences are due to the slight increase in the data set. 36 Columns 5 and 6 report results for a balanced panel of firms. In section IVA, we presented evidence to suggest that differences in plant exit rates, and missing data more generally, are not significant across compliance cycles. We might still be concerned that data are not missing at random. This can introduce bias into our results. 37 Columns 5 and 6 of table 5 report results from reestimating the model using data from the 87 firms that report emissions in all quarters. Although these estimates are qualitatively consistent with our main results, the dramatic reduction in sample size has a significant impact on the precision of the estimates.
C. Robustness Checks

VI. Summary and Conclusion
A particularly appealing aspect of the cap-and-trade approach to regulating industrial emissions is that provided 35 Aggregation of the quarterly emissions reports to biannual time periods forces us to drop observations because we require that a firm report emissions in both quarters of a given six-month period. 36 We also estimate a model that does not include facility-fixed effects using data aggregated annually. These results are qualitatively consistent with our analysis that uses quarterly and bianual data, although the results are quite imprecise. This occurs for two reasons. First, annual aggregation reduces the number of observations because we can use observations for a given facility and year only if the facility has reported emissions in all four quarters. Second, we can no longer include facility-fixed effects in the IV specification when the model is used using annual data. 37 Ideally, we would have an instrument that significantly determines selection into our sample, but can be credibly excluded from the outcome equation.Unfortunately, we were unable to find such a variable. Indeed, we doubt that such a variable exists. certain assumptions are met, the market will direct firms with the lowest abatement costs to reduce emissions, regardless of how permits are initially allocated. This important claim has been extremely difficult to test empirically because of the likely endogeneity of firm-level permit allocations with respect to emissions.
In Southern California's RECLAIM program, market participants were randomly assigned to permit allocation cycles. We use this random assignment to instrument for endogenous firm-specific permit allocations. When we do not instrument for permit allocations, we find a strong positive correlation between emissions and allocations. This could indicate a direct, causal relationship between permit allocations and emissions, or this could reflect a statistically significant correlation between emissions and the endogenous component of permit allocation schedules. More careful analysis lends support to the latter hypothesis. Our IV estimate (presumably free of omitted variables bias) is not statistically significant.
Based on these results, we fail to reject the hypothesis that nitrogen oxide emissions at RECLAIM firms were independent of how emissions permits were allocated across firms. This is an important result, but one that should be interpreted with great care. First, our identification strategy is limited by the kind of variation that is induced by random assignment to allocation cycles. Our results pertain to the causal effects of short-run changes in emissions permit allocations. In the empirical context we consider, short-run variation in the timing of a facility's permit allocation has potentially important implications for a facility's short-run production choices. However, our empirical strategy does not allow us to address the question of how variation in the total quantity of permits allocated to a facility over the duration of the emissions trading program might affect firms' emissions and emissions abatement decisions in the long run.
Finally, the lack of precision in the IV estimates warrants attention. We cannot confidently rule out all economically significant positive effects of permit allocations on emissions. In other words, our empirical findings are consistent with, but not proof of, the independence property. Further empirical testing of the independence of emissions and permit allocations is certainly warranted. Unfortunately, the paucity of truly exogenous variation in emissions permit allocations will likely make this difficult to implement.
APPENDIX A
The indirect profit function for a representative firm is given by π = Pq(e, x; z) − ω x x + τA − τe − T (e − A).
For expository purposes, we consider a simple production process that employs only two variable inputs: emissions and a generic input x. By Hotelling's lemma, input supply, and factor demand functions are implicitly defined by the first-order conditions for profit maximization:
After totally differentiating this system with respect to emissions and the exogenous variables, we can use Cramer's rule to identify the signs of the partial derivative of the emissions function with respect to the permit allocation A: 
APPENDIX B
Quarterly Emissions
All RECLAIM firms are required to submit quarterly emissions reports to SCAQMD. On average, there are 30 quarterly emissions reports per firm (of a possible 44 quarters for cycle 1 firms' and a possible 42 quarters for cycle 2 firms).
There are several reasons that emissions reports are not available for some firms for all possible quarters. In the early years of the program, several of the original firms dropped out of the RECLAIM program. Some firms closed for reasons unrelated to the RECLAIM program or were found to be exempt from RECLAIM after adjustments of initial emissions calculations revealed that the firms produced fewer than the limit of 4 tons per year (Lieu et al., 1998) . In addition, emission data are missing in some quarters because of malfunctioning emissions monitoring equipment or late reporting. If emissions are transmitted after the deadline, the report is rejected and recorded as missing (personal correspondence with George Haddad, SCAQMD, 2002).
Permit Allocations
SCAQMD maintains a database that tracks all NOx permits. This database contains initial RTC allocations, allocation adjustments, retirements, and trades (measured in pounds). From these data, we recovered the NOx permit allocation schedule for each of the facilities in our data. Any certified adjustments that were made by SCAQMD after the allocations were initially determined are included in these permit allocation data.
Industrial Classification
Using the information SCAQMD provides about the identity of RECLAIM firms, we determined the four-digit Standard Industry Classification System (SIC) code for each firm. This is not a one-to-one mapping; several of the facilities in the data are associated with multiple industrial classification codes. Overall, 144 industrial classifications are represented in the RECLAIM program. These SIC codes were mapped to North American Industry Classification (NAICS) codes.
Wages
Industry-specific wages at the county level are obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau's County Business Patterns. All prices are adjusted to 2000 constant dollars. Facilities were matched with wage data using SIC and NAICS codes. For disclosure reasons, wage data for some industry-countyyears are suppressed.
Producer Prices
Because we could not obtain firm-level data on revenues or product prices, we used the Bureau of Labor Statistic's four-digit NAICS and SIC Producer Product Indexes (PPI) as a proxy for shifts in product demand facing firms. There are several industrial classification categories for which producer price series could not be found, including finance, insurance, real estate, entertainment, and public administration categories.
